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On the Redistributive Impact of Privatizing a Resource
Under Imperfect Enforcement
We consider the redistributive eﬀects of privatizing a resource pre-
viously exploited under free access. We assume that illegal extraction
is punished but that the sanction is bounded by individual’s wealth.
First, we show that a segment of intermediate-wealth individuals is the
most adversely aﬀected from the regime change, while the poorest seg-
ment is not only less severely aﬀected, but may actually gain from it.
Next, we show how the authorities may prefer to choose an intermedi-
ate enforcement level in order to maximizes the political acceptability
of the regime switch among the local community.
Keywords: Property rights, enforcement, wealth distribution, nat-
ural resources, illegal extraction
JEL classiﬁcation: D78, K42, O13, O17, Q211 Introduction
Rural theft by itself is unremarkable; it is a nearly permanent
feature of agrarian life whenever and wherever the state and its
agents are insuﬃcient to control it. When such theft takes on the
dimensions of a struggle in which property rights are contested,
however, it becomes essential to any careful analysis of class
relations. (Scott, 1985, p. 265)
Explaining how property rights, or control, over economic resources are
created, and evolve through time, is a question that attracts increased re-
search interest among development economists and has certainly become a
core area which contributes to our understanding of the economic develop-
ment process. In the present study, we wish to add to this literature by
analyzing the redistributive eﬀects of privatizing a natural resource when
exclusion is imperfect.1 We are particularly concerned about the political
feasibility of the newly created private ownership regime. We thus consider
its impact among heterogeneous individuals living in the vicinity of the re-
source.
The setting in our model is that of a village located next to a natural
resource, such as a forest or ﬁshery. Initially, the resource is subject to
a regime of free-access. Villagers being heterogeneous as to their income
opportunities outside the resource, the free-access equilibrium is one in which
the marginal exploiter of the resource equates the average productivity of
the resource to the income he would get in his best alternative. The resource
is thus ineﬃciently exploited since the indiﬀerent exploiter has a marginal
productivity that lies strictly below that of his outside opportunity.
The local, or national, authorities privatize the resource by allowing
an outside ﬁrm to access the resource, while declaring illegal its access to
villagers. This implies that the authorities must enforce that limited access.
The physical nature of such resources as forests and ﬁsheries, however, makes
exclusion diﬃcult to enforce and often results in imperfect enforcement.
Hence, members of the local community may decide to extract the resource
illegally.
Situations in which the right of access to a resource is given to out-
siders are not uncommon. Klooster (2000a, 2000b) provides a case study
of the province of Oaxaca, Mexico, where the legal access to a forest is
given by the village authorities to an outside ﬁrm which hires labor from
outside the community. Villagers are thus not legally entitled to access
the forest. Enforcement is performed through a combination of eﬀorts by
the village authorities, the national forest service and the ﬁrm. Tree theft
nonetheless occurs and is said to have “the potential to drastically aﬀect
1By privatization, we imply the switch from a regime of free access to one of exclusive
ownership.
1the forest”(Klooster 2000a, p. 287).2 In Kalimantan, Indonesia, timber
concessions have been assigned to large-scale timber companies with close
connections to the Suharto family and the army. This eﬀectively pushed
local timber operations ”underground”, giving rise to the formation of an
informal timber economy (Casson and Obidzinski, 2002). In Senegal, Ribot
(1998) reports that access to forests is given to woodcutters originating from
outside the village, even though access is controlled by the village chiefs. Fi-
nally, Touﬁque (1997) describes the case of inland ﬁsheries in Bangladesh
where property rights go to large owners also originating from outside the
community, although it is not clear in this case where the ﬁshermen origi-
nate. It reports on encroachment and serious enforcement problems.
The main feature of our analysis resides in the combination of imper-
fect enforcement and heterogeneous villagers. Since villagers have diﬀerent
outside income opportunities, the severity of punishment for those who get
caught encroaching on the resource will diﬀer across individuals. More pre-
cisely, we adopt the argument that those who have low outside opportunities
may receive lower punishment when caught than those who have high out-
side opportunities. As a result, we show that individuals with low outside
opportunities may gain from the privatization of the resource, even though
they continue to exploit the resource as illegals. This is because once some
villagers are excluded from exploiting the resource, its average productivity
may increase in such a way as to make the poorest villagers better oﬀ. This
can be true even though none of the rents from the resource are returned
to the village, and none of the workers hired by the outside ﬁrm come from
the village.
Not all of the villagers gain from the privatization however. Following
privatization, those who decide to leave the resource will get a lower income
than the one they were getting from the resource in the free-access regime.
Moreover, a segment of those who continue to exploit the resource as illegals
will loose in the new regime. This category is characterized by outside
opportunities poor enough to prefer to continue exploiting the resource, but
high enough to get a signiﬁcant punishment when caught.3
The fact that people with lower opportunity cost of time tend to perform
illegal extraction ﬁnds support in some case studies. Illegal clam ﬁshing in
the Venice lagoon, as documented by The Independent of May 28 2001, rep-
resents a case. This activity is banned in almost all of the immense lagoon
because clams have been contaminated by local industrial plants. However,
2Klooster (2000a) provides an interesting and detailed account of how tree theft and
enforcement actually takes place on pages 286-291.
3Note that the redistributive eﬀects of a regime change from free access to private
ownership has been extensively studied for the case of property owners versus workers (See,
for instance, Weitzman, 1974 and Cohen and Weitzman, 1975). Our approach diﬀers from
those in that it concentrates on the redistributive eﬀects among heterogeneous workers
when enforcement is imperfect.
2illegal ﬁshing is a major activity involving approximately 800 small ﬁshing
crafts managed by part-time workers, pensioners and civil servants.4 Pre-
cisely those whose time opportunity cost is the lowest. Policemen recognize
that enforcement is diﬃcult even with modern speed boats. They complain
that “It’s frustrating for us because under law we are very limited. Only
if they are caught in the act of clam ﬁshing do they face persecution and
a maximum three-year jail term”. In practice, the more common sanction
seems to be a ﬁne. Another case refers to the timber extraction in Indonesia
already mentioned. According to Casson and Obidzinski, illegal logging is
hard labor and extremely dangerous but always available and comparatively
well paid. This pool of jobs involves around 12,000 people out of a approx-
imate population of 100,000 people on a part-time base. The authors add
that it “constitutes an important source of part-time employment for rural
poor”.
In our analysis, we ﬁnd that the authorities can aﬀect the degree of po-
litical feasibility of the regime change through the enforcement level, which
we express as the expected severity of punishment of an encroacher. A high
enforcement level has the advantage of leading to a more conservative use of
the resource as well as higher rents for its owner (which often partly accrue
to the local or national authorities in the form of royalties or bribes), but
carries the political cost of being too severe in its exclusion of the poorest
villagers. Our contention is that the authorities might prefer to choose an
intermediate level of enforcement in order to secure the political survival of
the new exploitation regime.5 6
The concept of a “politically acceptable” enforcement level also ﬁnds em-
pirical support. For instance, in Casson and Obidzinski’s Indonesian case of
illegal logging, enforcement is performed by local authorities. Their inter-
ests does not coincide perfectly with the central authority that distributed
timber concessions. The authors mention that, during economic crises, “lo-
cal government has been forced to be sympathetic to local community needs
and are turning a blind eye when it comes to illegal logging activities” (p.
2147). As evidence of the political pressure that local governments can face,
the author reported that during their stay in the region a police car had been
burned by loggers because the police had attempted to conﬁscate some of
4A local carabiniero, in charge of the enforcement, reported that “[clam ﬁshing] used to
be just traditional ﬁshing families. Now state servants, part-time workers and pensioners
are trying their hand at it”.
5Although Demsetz (1967) focused on the relative costs and beneﬁts of exchanging
property rights, he did recognize that a community’s tastes for property rights is an
important explanatory element. (p. 350) In the present study, we argue that these tastes
are (at least partly) endogenous as they depend on individual comparison between the
new an old property rights regimes.
6The fact that imperfect enforcement can be used as a means of redistributing wealth
is a point that has similarly been made by Lasserre and Soubeyran (1999). Their study
focuses on optimal enforcement when individuals have decreasing marginal utilities.
3the “illegal” timber they were transporting. Abbot and Mace (1999) pro-
vide an additional example for the case of illegal fuelwood collection in the
protected woodlands of Lake Malawi National Park. They report that the
low penalties imposed on illegal wood collectors “... may reﬂect a recent
policy toward more lenient penalties for illegal wood collectors to improve
the relations between park management and local communities.” (p. 420)
The establishment of property rights on a resource initially open to all is
commonly explained by changes in the beneﬁts and costs of exploiting the
resource and protecting those rights. Demsetz (1967), for instance, proposed
that an increase in the price of a resource can induce its exploiters to begin
to enforce a restricted access. His analysis focused mainly on changes in
the beneﬁts of enforcing property rights. But the change could also come
from a reduction in the costs of doing so. Anderson and Hill (1975) present
such a case when they argue that the introduction of barbed wire in the
American west allowed prairie farmers to enclose their land at a cost much
lower than before. Hence, property rights came about by a reduction in the
costs of enforcing those rights. Both studies assume exogenous enforcement
costs. These costs may however be endogenous and set by those who try to
gain control over the resource. Hotte (1997) makes that point by arguing
that the owner of a resource can resort to over-exploitation in order to
make poaching a less attractive option to others, thus lowering the costs
of excluding them. McCarthy et al. (2001) draw an analogous conclusion
in the case of a managed common property resource. Common to those
studies is the fact that the decision to enforce property rights is taken at the
individual level. This means that the state is either completely absent from
the analysis, or it has a passive role in that it does not attempt to inﬂuence
the decision to enforce property rights. The enforcement of property rights
is of course most frequently done with the complicity of the authorities
at the very least, if not by them.7 In the present study, we will assume
that enforcement is not under the owner’s control but undertaken by the
authorities.
The reader should bear in mind ﬁnally that this work constitutes a posi-
tive analysis that simply compares two exploitation regimes: free access and
private property. Such regimes are frequently observed. Privatization has
moreover often been recommended by international institutions as the so-
lution to over-exploitation under free access. Obviously, common property
constitutes a third option that might pareto-dominate the others. It is well-
known, however, that common property has its own sources of ineﬃciencies,
such as cooperative allocation of extraction quotas, peer-monitoring and
exclusion, and lack of investment in superior technologies (Ostrom, 1990;
Baland and Platteau, 1996). Its consideration goes beyond our original
7After all, one of the main raison d’ˆ etre of any state organization resides in its coercive
power against what it considers deviant behavior.
4intent for this study.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the local “phys-
ical” setting that we wish to analyze. We then solve for the free-access
and private property equilibria in the subsequent two sections. The analy-
sis of the distributive impact of privatization (without rent distribution) is
performed in Section 5, while the political-economic implications of vary-
ing the enforcement level are considered in Section 6. Section 7 discusses
the political-economic acceptance of privatization with rent distribution. A
conclusion reviews the results and discusses possible extensions.
2 The community and its resource
A community is composed of individuals who diﬀer solely by the op-
portunity cost of their time. We wish to interpret this opportunity cost as
a proxy for their wealth, or income opportunities, outside of the natural
resource under consideration here. Those individuals are distributed on a
continuum of opportunity costs c, within range [0;¯ c], according to some dis-
tribution function G(c). The total population of the community is of mass
N.
The community is located next to a natural-resource site which is charac-
terized by a certain diﬃculty in limiting its access to the general population.
Typical examples include ﬁsheries, forests for wood or fuel-wood, hunting
grounds and pastures. Exclusion is thus a costly activity. The total harvest
of the resource is given by h(x), where x represents the total extraction
eﬀort of the community. For ease of exposition, the average product of the
resource, h(x)=x, will be denoted as Á(x). Each unit of the resource sells
for a price p. The average return from each unit of extraction eﬀort is thus
pÁ(x).8
Each individual is endowed with one unit of inelastically supplied labor
time, which can be devoted either to the exploitation of the resource or
to some alternative activity. The returns from resource exploitation are
endogenous to the present model and will depend, among other things, on
the eﬀective property regime, as described below. The returns to alternative
activities are exogenous and given by c as described above.
3 The free-access regime
If the resource is subject to a free-access regime, individuals will enter
the resource so long as the gains from doing so exceed their opportunity
cost c. Let cfa denote the opportunity cost of the individual who is indif-
ferent between exploiting the resource or not. In order to have an interior











Figure 1: The free-access equilibrium
equilibrium with cfa 2 [0;¯ c], we assume that pÁ(N) < ¯ c. The return from
each unit of labor time being equal to the mean return from each unit of
extraction eﬀort, cfa is deﬁned by the following condition:
(1) pÁ(NG(cfa)) = cfa:
In a free-access regime, all individuals whose opportunity cost of labor
time is below cfa will enter the resource. Each receives a surplus of
(2) sfa(c) = pÁ(NG(cfa)) ¡ c
from doing so. Individuals whose opportunity cost lies above cfa will not
exploit the resource. Their surplus from a free-access regime is zero.
4 The private property regime
In order to analyze the political-economic problem in its simplest form,
we assume that following privatization of the resource site, both the rents
and the hired input payments accrue to individuals located outside the com-
munity. At ﬁrst sight, this may give the impression that nobody from the
community stands to gain from a privatization of the resource. We will see
that it is not necessarily so in the context of imperfect enforcement of prop-
erty rights. In order to distinguish between outside workers hired by the
6owner and individuals living in the community next to the natural-resource
site, we shall refer to the latter as villagers.
Once the authorities have opted for private ownership, they must en-
force that arrangement by excluding “potential” encroachers.9 This will
take the form of a probability (¸) of catching an encroacher and punishing
him. Enforcement activities are the prerogative of the authorities only. The
enforcement level ¸ is thus taken as exogenous for the owner.
The problem of the resource owner is to maximize his proﬁts by hiring
l workers at constant unit cost w, while taking into account the induced
eﬀect on the level of encroachment, given enforcement level ¸. Moreover,
compared to an individual in a free-access situation, the owner may have
better equipment available to its workers, because, say, of easier access to
credit, more secure investment, or the possibility of beneﬁtting from increas-
ing returns. We thus introduce a superior extraction technology by assuming
that each hired worker has an eﬀective labor input b times larger than that
of a villager, with b ¸ 1. Hence, the total eﬀective labor input chosen by
the owner equals bl.
We assume that the decision to encroach by a villager is taken after
having observed the level of exploitation bl by the owner and knowing the
probability ¸ of being caught and punished. In order to solve the problem
of the owner, it is thus necessary to derive ﬁrst the equilibrium level of
encroachment for any given bl and ¸.
4.1 Punishment and the decision to encroach
As in the case of free access, we assume that all villagers face a choice
between using their unit of labor time on the resource, or getting c from their
best alternative activity. Their (gross) return from exploiting the resource
is still the value of average product pÁ(x), where the total eﬀort devoted
to the exploitation of the resource, x, now combines the owner’s input level
bl and the total number of encroachers. From a villager’s point of view,
the institution of private ownership diﬀers from that of free access in that
if he chooses to exploit the resource, he becomes an encroacher and faces a
probability ¸ of being caught and punished.
In the present analysis, we wish to bring out the importance of the role
played by the instrument of punishment. More precisely, we will account
for the fact that the severity of punishment of an individual is proportional
to the level of his wealth, or income opportunities. Note that we do not
make a clear diﬀerence between wealth and income opportunities since they
are normally highly correlated, especially when it comes to the punishment
of individuals.10 In the literature on crime and punishment, one can ﬁnd
9Depending on the context, the terms “thief”, “poacher” or “smuggler” are also often
used. We adopt the term “encroacher” for convenience.
10An “unoccupied” wealthy person could always acquire capital such as land or a busi-
7numerous reasons why a wealthier person would receive a higher punishment,
in its monetary equivalent value, than a poorer one for the same crime. One
obvious reason is that during imprisonment, the wealthier the person, the
larger the foregone income. But there is also the adverse eﬀect on the
reputation of the person caught encroaching, which may reduce its future
income opportunities (Lott 1990); the fact that the poor person may simply
not have the means to pay the ﬁne (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000); or that an
enforcement oﬃcer may be more lenient with a poor person than a rich one
(Wiegand 1993, Casson and Obidzinski, 2002).11
We therefore assume that once caught, an encroacher receives a ﬁne
equal to °c, with ° ¸ 0. For any exploitation level x, the expected surplus
from encroachment, for a villager of wealth c, is thus given by
(3) sp(c) = pÁ(x) ¡ c ¡ ¸°c;
where superscript p refers to the private property regime. For any given bl
and ¸, a villager of wealth c will decide to encroach as long as he gain from
doing so, pÁ(x), does not fall below its expected opportunity cost, c+¸°c.12
Now NG(c) increases with c, and Á(x) is strictly decreasing. This implies
that for any given l, the total number of encroachers will be determined by
the following equality:
(4) pÁ(bl + NG(cp) = (1 + ¸°)cp;
where cp denotes the marginal encroacher, that is, the one who is indiﬀerent
between encroaching on the resource or receiving his best alternative income
cp. The implicit relation between cp and l, as deﬁned by equation (4), will
henceforth be refered to as cp(l).
Note that the possibility of all villagers encroaching, that is pÁ(bl+N) ¸
(1 + ¸°)¯ c, is ruled out by the previously made assumption that cfa 2 [0;¯ c].
4.2 The resource owner’s problem
The resource site owner will choose input level l while taking into account




¼ = pÁ(bl + NG(cp(l)))bl ¡ wl:
ness on which to work and receive a higher return to labor than a poor individual without
access to such capital.
11It may be argued that the rich can often “buy” justice by aﬀording better defense
(Lott 1987), bribing a guard, or inﬂuencing a judge (with promise of future favor or
some loss of reputation). But this only implies that richer individuals have the means to
avoid conviction and are willing to pay more for it; it does not mean that the monetary
equivalent cost of having been caught is lower for them.
12Note that in order to simplify the analysis and concentrate on the issue of choice of
property regime, we assume all individuals to be neutral towards risk.
8The ﬁrst-order condition is

















1 + °¸ ¡ Ng(cp)pÁ0(z + NG(cp))
b;
where g(c) is the density function corresponding to wealth distribution G(c).
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of (6) says that the marginal beneﬁt
of a unit increase in l is to raise proﬁts by labor’s value of average product
pÁ(x)b. This corresponds to the usual result, aside from the fact that the
average product depends not only on l, but also on the total number of
encroachers NG(cp(l)).
The second term on the left-hand side of (6) accounts for the fact that
an increase in the number of inputs aﬀects negatively the value of average
product, an eﬀect that has repercussions on all inputs l already in place. This
eﬀect diﬀers from the usual case without encroachment in that a one unit
increase in l will not be matched one-to-one by a unit increase in total inputs
exploiting the resource. This is so because as l increases, the reduction in
the average product will drive out some encroachers, as implied by equation
(4). Indeed, equation (7) gives the magnitude of the change in encroachment
following a one unit increase in l, an amount that lies between -b and 0.
Finally, a unit increase in l increases the wage bill by w, as given by the
right-hand side of (6).
Notice that the free-access regime with a large exploiter is just a special
case of the private property regime. Indeed, if we let ¸° tend to 0 in the
private property regime described above, then all individuals are allowed to
enter the resource without punishment. This is the same at adding a large
exploiter to the free-access regime described in Section 3. The free-access
regime with a large outside exploiter is thus described by conditions (4), (6)
and (7), at the limit where ¸° = 0.
Obviously, the addition of a large, outside exploiter to the pre-existing
free-access regime will increase the intensity of exploitation of the resource.
The equilibrium average product of the resource will thus be lowered, with
the result that all the small village exploiters will be made worse-oﬀ with
the introduction of a large exploiter. We will see below, however, that if the
resource is privatized but imperfectly enforced, then some exploiters may be
made better oﬀ.
5 The distributive eﬀect of privatization
The heterogeneity of individuals introduces an asymmetry in the rela-
tive gains or losses from privatization. We argue that the presence of en-
croachment on the privatized resource is not only compatible with the proﬁt
9maximizing behavior of its owner, but may actually make the privatization
beneﬁcial for a certain segment of the population, the poorest one for that
matter. And this can be true even though neither the rents, nor the labor
payments, are returned to the community.
The following discussion assumes that before privatization, the large
exploiter was not allowed to exploit the resource. The benchmark free-access
regime we refer to is thus the one depicted in section 3.
As will become obvious below, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
some of the poorest individuals to gain from privatization is for the value
of average product of the resource to increase following privatization. Con-
sider a situation in which pÁp > pÁfa, where pÁp and pÁfa are the average
product values with private ownership and free access respectively.13 For
those who continue to exploit the resource after its privatization, i.e. the
encroachers, the expected income is now pÁp ¡ ¸°c. Before privatization,
they were getting pÁfa. For those who leave the resource, they now get their
next best alternative, i.e. c. Following privatization, some villagers will nec-
essarily leave the resource since the introduction of punishment increases
their opportunity cost, i.e. cp < cfa.
It now becomes clear why the very poorest individuals may gain from
the privatization. Take the poorest one for instance. Since c = 0, he will
not be punished if caught. Hence, his opportunity cost from exploiting the
resource does not change following privatization, while his returns increase
by pÁp¡pÁfa. All those who have very low c’s are in a similar situation: the
very limited punishment that they can receive when caught is not enough
to outweigh the gain from the increased productivity of the resource.
Figure 2 illustrates a case where pÁfa is the (equal) income received by
each villager exploiting the resource in the free-access regime, and curve
pÁp ¡¸°c denotes the expected income received by those villagers who con-
tinue to exploit the resource as illegals, which now depends on c. cp repre-
sents the marginal encroacher as deﬁned by pÁp ¡ ¸°cp = cp. The regime
switch has thus reduced the number of villagers exploiting the resource from
NG(cfa) to NG(cp), which has contributed to increase the value of average
product from pÁfa to pÁp. A villager of wealth level ˆ c is thus indiﬀerent
between both regimes.
For all those individuals with c 2 [0;ˆ c], the net expected return with
private ownership exceeds the one they were getting in free access. On the
other hand, the villagers with wealth between ˆ c and cp loose from the priva-
tization. This is because their alternatives are poor enough to make them
prefer to exploit the resource as encroachers, but they are good enough to
give them a signiﬁcant punishment when caught. As a result, their expected
income is driven below the one they were getting as free-access exploiters.
13Remember that the average product in private ownership is endogenous and must
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Figure 2: The private-ownership and free-access equilibria
Those whose wealth lies between cp and cfa also loose from the privati-
zation, even though they do not encroach on the resource. This is because
with their higher wealth, the threat of punishment becomes large enough to
make them leave the resource and revert to their alternative income c which,
for those individuals, is lower than what they were getting in the free-access
regime. The full line in Figure 3 represents the variation in expected income,
for all individuals, following privatization without rent redistribution.
Note that the argument presented here is not general. As mentioned
above, if the rents are not redistributed among the community, a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the argument to hold is that the average product
of the resource increase after privatization. Appendix A presents the results
of a simulation with a quadratic total output function and a uniform popu-
lation distribution. The parameters have been chosen in order to illustrate
the possibility of an increase in average productivity following privatization.
What if the large exploiter was present in the pre-existing free-access
regime? It is shown in Appendix B that pÁp strictly increases with ¸° and
that the converse holds for cp. A privatization of the resource will thus
always increase the value of average product of the resource, resulting in a
sure gain for some the poorest individuals, while making some intermediate
wealth individuals worse oﬀ.
From ﬁgure 2, one can see, also, that if privatization leads to a lower
equilibrium average product, then even though all villagers are adversely
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Figure 3: Variation of income
intermediate wealth villagers.
The following proposition summarizes our results:
Proposition 1 (i) There always exists a certain range of intermediate
wealth individuals that will be made worse oﬀ following a privatization of
the resource. (ii) Compared to a free-access regime, the poorest segment
of the population gain from the regime change if, and only if, the average
product increases following privatization. (iii) If the average productivity
does decrease after privatization, then all villagers are adversely aﬀected,
but the eﬀect on the poorest individuals is less severe than some segment of
intermediate wealth villagers. (vi) If the large exploiter is already present in
the free-access regime, then the poorest segment of the population necessarily
gains from the regime change.
Since the equilibrium average product is privately determined, we would
like to understand how it is aﬀected by the diﬀerent parameters of the model.
More speciﬁcally, one would like to see if and how the authorities could
aﬀect the private equilibrium average product through its choice of detection
probability ¸ or severity of punishment °, thereby aﬀecting the distributional
impact of the regime change.
126 The enforcement level
We now turn to the eﬀects of a varying the enforcement level, subsumed
here by the probability of detecting an encroacher (¸) multiplied by the
severity of punishment (°). The purpose of performing such an analysis
is to see whether and how the authorities of the community could aﬀect
the redistributive eﬀects of privatization solely through the instrument of
enforcement. If it were the case, then the degree of success, i.e. its social
and political acceptability, of the privatization process could depend on how
it is enforced.14 This issue is of particular relevance for a state which cannot
eﬀectively tax the resource and redistribute it within the community.
We note ﬁrst that an increase in ¸° necessarily leads to an increase in
the average product of the resource. Indeed, an increase in the enforcement
level makes encroachment less attractive, with the result that the owner
does not need to resort to so much over-exploitation of the resource in order
to deter encroachers. The overall intensity of exploitation of the resource is
thus reduced, which leads to an increase in its average product. (A formal
proof of this is provided in Appendix B.)
















The sign of the two derivatives within brackets is formally derived in
Appendix B. A more intuitive explanation is provided here with reference
to Figure 2. The ﬁrst eﬀect on the right-hand side of (8) is make the slope
of curve pÁp ¡ ¸°c steeper in absolute value. This negative eﬀect tends
to reduce the number of encroachers, NG(cp), and also reduce the number
of those who gain from the regime change, NG(ˆ c). The second eﬀect on
the right-hand side of (8) is due to the increase in the equilibrium value of
average product of the resource. This second eﬀect shifts curve pÁp ¡ ¸°c
upward, thus increasing the numbers of encroachers, NG(cp), and also the
number of those who gain from the regime change, NG(ˆ c).
The net eﬀect is ambiguous. One can nevertheless argue that if, for some
¸°, pÁp > pÁfa (a necessary and suﬃcient condition for NG(ˆ c) > 0), then
there must exist a ﬁnite and positive enforcement level which maximizes
the number of those who gain from the regime change. It is easy to see,
indeed, that for arbitrarily large values of ¸°, the encroachment level is
driven to zero without the need for the owner to over-exploit the resource.
As far as the owner is concerned, this is akin to a situation of perfectly and
14Peluso (1992) goes further by arguing that we should interpret violent and nonvio-
lent forms of peasant resistance “as responses to speciﬁc forms of control over access to
resources” (p. 19). She interprets tree theft not only as a means of generating income,
but also a form of nonviolent resistance.
13costlessly enforced property rights. If, on the other hand, ¸° = 0, then
pÁp · pÁfa, since this situation is equivalent to simply adding an exploiter
to the pre-existing free-access situation. In both situations, no encroacher
gains from the privatization of the resource, i.e. NG(ˆ c) = 0 in both cases.
The following proposition entails from a continuity argument:
Proposition 2 If there exists an enforcement level ¸° for which pÁp >
pÁfa, then there must exist an enforcement level which maximizes the num-
ber of those who gain from the privatization, NG(ˆ c).
This result implies that if the enforcement level is set very low, then the
arrival of an outside ﬁrm will make everyone worse oﬀ in the village. This
is because the situation approaches that of a free access situation and the
outside ﬁrm will just make matters worse for the resource.15 Alternatively,
if the enforcement level is set very high, then the resource will be more
eﬃciently exploited. However, except for extremely poor individuals who
stand nothing to loose from being caught encroaching, barely any villager
will gain from the privatization. Let us imagine, as is often the case, that
the state or local members of the authorities collect a share of the rents from
the privatized resource, either as part owners of the outside ﬁrm or in the
form of bribes from the ﬁrm. They may decide to impose an intermediate
enforcement level in order not to raise too much local opposition to an
outside ﬁrm exploiting the resource, at the cost of lower rents.
7 The redistribution of rents from privatization
Assume that, following privatization, the community gets a share ¿ of
resource rents ¼ by selling the resource and/or taxing the owner. Due to
transaction costs, tax distortions, bureaucratic ineﬃciencies, or corruption,
this share ¿ is less than one. In an economy characterized by a high capacity
to raise taxes and redistribute the proceeds, and a low level of corruption,
the share ¿ can be large. Otherwise, ¿ is small as the proceeds from privati-
zation are retained by corrupt oﬃcials or because the state’s administration
is simply too weak to eﬀectively collect taxes. Parameter ¿ can thus be
interpreted as a proxy to a state’s capacity to eﬀectively raise taxes and
redistribute its proceeds.16
A privatization of the resource will also drain additional resources from
the community since it must now enforce its agreement to privatize the
resource. Suppose that the share of rents collected, ¿¼, outweighs this addi-
tional enforcement cost so that a net gain, ±(¿;¼) > 0, can be redistributed
15This argument assumes no redistribution of rents among the villagers.
16Klooster (2000b) and Ribot (1998) both report on the fact that a signiﬁcant part
of the rents from the exploitation of the forest are not returned to villagers as they are
captured by the village chiefs. In Casson and Obidzinski (2002), the rent is captured by
central government elites and key military ﬁgures to the prejudice of local communities.
14among the community. Take the simple case where ±(¿;¼) is distributed
equally through a uniform lump-sum transfer or the provision of a public
good. Each individual’s net gain or loss is shifted upward by ±(¿;¼)=N in
Figure 3.
The ﬁgure suggests that those who stand to loose the most from the
privatization of the resource are still the intermediate wealth individuals.
Moreover, the poorest and wealthiest individuals in the local community
will likely form a coalition in favor the privatization, while the intermediate
wealth individuals might oppose it.
Suppose now that the authorities would like to increase the acceptability
of the privatization process and are somehow able, through a redistribution
scheme, to target individuals with certain wealth characteristics. Figure 3
reveals that intermediate wealth individuals would be targeted ﬁrst. Indeed,
wealthy individuals, namely those labelled by c 2 [cfa;¯ c], are indiﬀerent be-
tween free-access and private property and can be convinced by receiving
any small positive transfer. The poorest individuals already gain. By di-
recting the higher share of the rent to intermediate wealth agents, i.e. those
with c 2 [ˆ c;cfa], their losses can be mitigated or eventually turned into a
gain from privatization. One could ﬁnd parameter values for which unanim-
ity on privatization would be achieved. It would be the case in a country
characterized by a high enough ¿. This suggests that natural resources
should be easier to privatize in less corrupt economies, or at least in those
with a higher state capacity to raise taxes and redistribute the proceeds by
targeting intermediate wealth individuals.17
It is unfortunately too often unrealistic to suppose that a less-developed
country can devise a direct redistribution scheme that can eﬀectively tar-
get the intermediate wealth classes. However, it can be – and often is –
done indirectly. Government programs for micro-credit provision provide
an example. Its benefactors are more likely to be the intermediate wealth
agents (See Aghion and Bolton 1997).18 This renders privatization more
acceptable to the community. The public provision of secondary level ed-
ucation constitutes certainly another way of targeting intermediate wealth
households.
17The above argument assumes, for simplicity, that the average product of the resource
increases after privatization. If it were not the case, a similar argument could be made
except for the fact that the poorest individuals would need to be compensated also, though
at a lower rate than the intermediate wealth ones.
18Note that by borrowing money, those same individuals gain access to higher outside
opportunity, which has the additional beneﬁt of lowering their incentives to encroach on
the resource. This should beneﬁt both the owners of the resource and the rest of the
encroachers.
158 Conclusion
In this study, we have argued that with imperfect enforcement, the wel-
fare impact of resource privatization may depend on individual wealth. More
precisely, we have shown that in comparison to a free-access regime, private
exploitation with partial enforcement may hit the “moderately” poor harder
than the poorest individuals. It can even be the case that the poorest fa-
vor privatization, even though it turns them into illegal exploiters of the
resource who face a probability of being caught and punished. The reason
is that if, by limiting access, privatization improves the productivity of the
resource, this gain will be felt equally by all those who continue to access the
resource. But the punishment eﬀect will not be spread equally as individuals
with higher wealth may receive larger punishment than poorer ones.
An implication of the above result is that when there are no other means
of redistributing income, the leaders of a community, if concerned about
their political survival, may prefer softer enforcement, knowing that it may
beneﬁt the poorest individuals – or hurt them less. As a result, we argue
that there must exist an intermediate enforcement level which maximizes the
number of those who gain from privatization. Note that softer enforcement
is done at the cost of lower rents for the private exploiter of the resource,
which may translate into less kickbacks for the leaders of the community, be
it in the form of royalties or bribes.
Another implication is that if some of the rents from a privatization of
the resource do ﬁnd their way back to the community, a ”politically sound”
strategy would be to redirect more of it to the moderately poor, not the
poorest.
It goes without saying that the eﬀects of privatization considered here are
of interest only if the authorities cannot eﬀectively redistribute income by
properly targeting the most needy. They are thus mostly relevant in a setting
where the state is too weak or rudimentary. Otherwise, such a redistribution
scheme would not be desirable since it is made at the cost of a less eﬃcient
resource usage. With a well developed state apparatus, strong enforcement
with taxation of the rents earmarked for redistribution would certainly be
superior. One would therefore expect such an instrument of redistribution
to be used more frequently in less-developed countries. Whether this is so
is an empirical question which remains open.
16APPENDIX
A An example
The output function As is common in the case of a renewable re-
source, we take a quadratic total resource output, i.e. h(x) = (® ¡ ¯x)x.
The average product is thus Á(x) = ® ¡ ¯x.
The population distribution function The population is uniformly
distributed, i.e. G(c) = c=¯ c, c 2 [0;¯ c].
Simulation results We insert those functional expressions into equa-
tion (6), (7) and (3) and use the following parameter values:
(9) ® = 40;¯ = 0:5;p = 1;¯ c = 10;N = 200;b = 2;¸ = 0:02;° = 50;w = 5:
This yields the following equilibrium values for a free-access regime:
cfa = 3:64; NG(cfa) = 72:73; pÁfa = 3:64; h(NG(cfa)) = 264:5:
And the following equilibrium values for the private ownership regime:
cp = 2:29; NG(cp) = 45:83; pÁp = 4:58; h(lp + NG(cp)) = 324:65;
lp = 12:5; ˆ c = 0:95; ¼ = 52:08:
The results of this simulation matches well the case illustrated in Figure
2. Indeed, following privatization, the owner’s proﬁt maximizing choice of l
is such that the value of average product of the resource increases relative
to the free-access case. The privatization is thus beneﬁcial to the poorest
segment of the population. An individual characterized by c = 0:95 will
be indiﬀerent between the two regimes as he gets an expected income of
4:58¡(0:02¤50¤0:95) = 3:64 in the private property regime, a value which
corresponds exactly to what he was getting in the free-access regime.
B The eﬀect of varying the enforcement level
B.1 The eﬀect on the average product of the resource
Let xp be the equilibrium total input on the resource, i.e. xp = blp +


















The last inequality stems from (7).
The implicit relation between lp and ¸° is given by ﬁrst-order condition
(6). Assuming that the second-order condition for a maximum holds, one
can verify that @lp=@¸° · 0. Hence, @xp=@¸° < 0. Since the average
product is strictly decreasing with total input, a more severe enforcement
level necessarily results in an increase in the resource’s average product.
17B.2 The eﬀect on the number of encroachers
From the implicit relation in (4), it can be veriﬁed that @cp=@¸° < 0 and
@cp=@l < 0. Since, as mentioned above, @lp=@¸° · 0, the total derivative of
cp with respect to an increase in the enforcement level is ambiguous.
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